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Transitive inference reasoning involves the examination and comparison of a given number of
relational pairs in order to understand overall group hierarchy (e.g., A4B, B4C, C4D; therefore is
A4D?). A number of imaging studies have demonstrated the role of the parietal cortex for resolving
transitive inferences. Some studies also identify the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex as being critical for
‘‘relational integration’’ processes supporting transitive reasoning. To clarify this issue, we carried out a
transitive inference study involving neurological patients with focal lesions to the rostrolateral
prefrontal (n¼5) or parietal cortices (n¼7), as well as normal controls (n¼6). The patients and
controls were statistically matched on age, education, pre-injury IQ, general memory, working memory,
and performance/full IQ, though the rostrolateral patients did score signiﬁcantly higher than the
normal controls on verbal IQ. Results indicate that patients with focal lesions to the parietal cortex were
impaired in the task relative to both the patients with focal lesions to rostrolateral prefrontal cortex and
the control group, and there was no difference in task performance between the rostrolateral prefrontal
and the control groups. This result continued to hold after controlling for verbal IQ as a covariate. These
ﬁndings point to a critical role for the parietal cortex, rather than the rostrolateral prefrontal, in
transitive inference. Since the groups performed similarly on a working memory task, working memory
cannot fully account for the result, suggesting a speciﬁc role of parietal cortex in transitive inference.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-SA license. 1. Introduction
Many of the decisions humans make involve comparing
numerous pieces of information. For example, in determining
which students will be offered admission to College, entrance
ofﬁcials may rank order the students from highest to lowest SAT
score. The process of examining and comparing a given number of
relations in order to understand overall group hierarchy is
commonly referred to as transitive inference. For example, given
that A4B, B4C, C4D, a reasoner will understand that A4D
without being explicitly told so. This process is a cornerstone of
logic and may have its origins in the need for socially organized
species to infer dominance relations (Delius and Siemann, 1998)..026
.L. Waechter).
C-SA license. A number of neuroimaging studies have examined the neural
correlates of transitive inference reasoning over the past 15 years
(Acuna, Eliassen, Donoghue, & Sanes, 2002; Fangmeier & Knauff,
2009; Fangmeier, Knauff, Ruff, & Sloutsky, 2006; Goel & Dolan, 2001;
Goel, Gold, Kapur, & Houle, 1998; Goel, Makale, & Grafman, 2004;
Goel, Stollstorff, Nakic, Kuntson, & Grafman, 2009; Heckers, Zalesak,
Weiss, Ditman, & Titone, 2004; Knauff, Fangmeier, Ruff,
& Johnson-Laird, 2003; Knauff, Mulack, Kassubek, Salih, & Greenlee,
2002; Prado, Van Der Henst, & Noveck, 2010; Ruff, Knauff, Fangmeier,
& Spreer, 2003; Wendelken & Bunge, 2009). These studies report
varied activation in a number of brain areas, including the right and/
or left lateral prefrontal cortex (BA 9, 10, 44, 45, 46, 47), medial frontal
cortex (BA 8, 33), bilateral superior parietal cortex (BA 7, 39, 40),
bilateral inferior/middle temporal lobes (BA 20, 21, 22, 31, 37, 38),
bilateral middle occipital lobes (BA 17, 18, 19) and premotor cortex.
A recent qualitative review of the neuroimaging literature
argues that much of this variation in brain activity may be
explained in terms of task variables such as the presence or
Table 1
Percent damage to Brodmann areas and percent accuracy on the transitive
inference task for each patient (Pat. no.) (hemisphere of BA 10 or BA 7/40 damage).
Brodmann
Area
Frontal lobes Parietal lobes Accuracy
on task
10 9 11 12 44 45 46 47 7 40 1-2-
3
22 39
Rostrolateral prefrontal patients (N¼5)
Pat. 0267
(L)
31 – 14 30 – – – – – – – – – .896
Pat. 1364
(L)
31 7 – – – – – – – – – – – .625
Pat. 1585
(R)
27 – 7 5 – 9 – – – – – – – .688
Pat. 2309
(Bi)
10 – – 8 – 8 – 10 – – – – – .833
Pat. 3013
(R)




– – – – – – – – 7 – – – 19 .583
Pat. 1061
(R)
– – – – – – – – 4 6 – – – .417
Pat. 1288
(L)
– – – – – – – – 2 42 – – 6 .667
Pat. 1298
(R)
– – – – – – – – – 12 – – 10 .625
Pat. 2341
(L)
– – – – – – – – 13 9 – – 13 .229
Pat. 3054
(Bi)
– – – – – – – – 5 3 8 – – .375
Pat. 3081
(R)
– – – – – – – – 17 – – – – .521
R.L. Waechter et al. / Neuropsychologia 51 (2013) 464–471 465absence of content, conﬂict, and determinacy. Moreover it iden-
tiﬁes a bilateral parietal network with task speciﬁc frontal lobe
involvement (as a function of content, conﬂict, and indetermi-
nacy) as underlying transitive inference (Goel, 2007). A more
recent quantitative meta-analysis of imaging studies of logical
reasoning ﬁnds consistent activation in a bilateral parietal and
lateral frontal lobe network including bilateral middle frontal
gyrus (BA 6), bilateral precuneus (BA 7), left angular gyrus (BA 39)
and left intraparietal sulcus (BA 40) associated with transitive
reasoning (Prado, Chadha, & Booth, 2011). However, at least two
imaging studies have concluded that right anterior medial/ros-
trolateral (BA 10) prefrontal cortex (not parietal cortex) is critical
for the ‘‘relational integration‘‘ processes involved in transitive
inference (Fangmeier et al., 2006; Wendelken & Bunge, 2009).
Patient data on transitive inference tasks are scarce. Some
early studies examined the effect of focal lesions to the temporal
lobes on transitive inference tasks (Caramazza, Gordon, Zurif, &
DeLuca, 1976; Read, 1981). Only three studies have examined the
effect of frontal lobe deﬁcits on transitive inference.
Vartanian, Goel, Tierney, Huey, and Grafman (2009) compared
14 patients with the frontal variant of frontotemporal dementia
(FTD) and 21 normal controls on familiar and unfamiliar transi-
tive inference items. They found that patients with frontal variant
FTD were more impaired on transitive reasoning trials containing
content that they had beliefs about (e.g. London is north of Cairo),
but not trials containing content that they could not have had
any beliefs about (e.g., the library is north of the Roth center)
compared to the control group. These results are consistent with
the importance of a frontal-temporal brain network for resolving
inferences that people have beliefs about (Goel, 2007).
Koscik and Tranel (2012) examined performance of patients
with ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) damage (n¼15) to
patients with damage in other brain areas (with the foci in medial
temporal cortex) (n¼36), and neurologically normal participants
(n¼44) on a transitive inference task consisting of an ordered set
of arbitrary patterns (using a non-verbal training paradigm). They
found that damage to the vmPFC resulted in a deﬁcit in the ability
to use transitive inference, and this deﬁcit was not driven by
deﬁcient learning of relationships between items, extrapolation to
novel pairings in general, or differences in reinforcement or
punishment during a training phase (Koscik & Tranel, 2012).
Waltz et al. (1999) examined the performance of frontotemporal
dementia patients with primarily prefrontal damage (n¼6), and
primarily anterior temporal damage (n¼5) against neurologically
intact individuals (n¼7) on transitive inference tasks, which varied
in their level of difﬁculty. Difﬁculty was determined by the ordering
of the premise pairs. Linear or chained ordering (Sam taller than
Nate; Nate taller than Roy) corresponded to Level 1 difﬁculty while
nonlinear/scrambled ordering (Beth taller than Tina; Amy taller than
Beth) corresponded to Level 2 difﬁculty. Waltz et al. (1999) reported
that frontotemporal dementia patients with primarily prefrontal
cortex damage were signiﬁcantly impaired in determining the
validity of scrambled (Level 2) transitive inference problems, com-
pared to patients with mostly temporal lobe damage and normal
controls. The frontal patients did not perform any worse than the
temporal patients and normal controls when the relational complex-
ity associated with the task was lowest (i.e., Level 1), that is, when
the premises were chained. This study has contributed to the claim
that prefrontal cortex is necessary for resolving transitive inference.
No studies of transitive inference involving neurological
patients with focal lesions speciﬁcally to rostrolateral prefrontal
cortex and/or parietal cortex are reported in the literature. To
address this gap in the patient literature, and the seeming
inconsistency in the imaging literature regarding the roles of
rostrolateral prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex in transitive
inference, we conducted a study designed to directly compare theperformance of patients with focal lesions to rostrolateral pre-
frontal cortex and parietal lobes with that of normal controls on
transitive inference tasks. If the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex is
necessary for transitive inference, as predicted by the imaging
studies of Fangmeier et al. (2006) and Wendelken and Bunge
(2009), we would expect the rostrolateral prefrontal-damaged
group to be impaired on the task. If the parietal lobes are
necessary for transitive inference, as predicted by a majority of
the imaging studies and meta-analyses (Goel, 2003; Goel, Buchel,
Frith, & Dolan, 2000; Goel & Dolan, 2001, 2003; Knauff et al.,
2003; Prado et al., 2010, 2011) we would expect the parietal-
damaged group to be impaired on the task.2. Method
2.1. Patient selection
All participants were male and selected from the Vietnam Head Injury Study
(Phase 3). Both patients and controls served in the VietnamWar during the late 1960s
and early 1970s. The patients all received penetrating head injuries during their
service in Vietnam. Thus their etiology, injury dates, and recovery periods are similar.
The normal controls did not receive any head injuries during their service. All
participants had relatively intact sensory, motor, language, and cognitive functions,
as determined by neurological and neuropsychological testing (see below).
The inclusion criteria for the frontal lobe-damaged group were focal lesions to
rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, primarily BA 10 (bilaterally). Due to a lack of
patients with damage strictly to BA 10, we included those with mostly BA 10
damage and limited damage to other frontal areas (BA 9, 11, 12, 45, 46, and 47)
(see Table 1 and Fig. 1, which report lesions in other BA areas with a minimum of
5% damage). The ﬁnal rostrolateral prefrontal group consisted of 5 patients, whose
percent damage to bilateral BA 10 ranged from 10% to 31%. Importantly, none of
these patients had lesions outside of the frontal lobes.
The parietal group was selected based on focal damage primarily to BA 7 and 40
(bilaterally). Again, given only two patients with damage limited to strictly BA 7 and
40, we included those with limited damage to other parietal areas (BA 1–2–3, and
39) (see Table 1 and Fig. 2, which report lesions in other BA areas with a minimum of
5% damage). The ﬁnal parietal group consisted of 7 patients, whose percent damage
Fig. 1. Overlay of brain areas damaged across the 5 patients in the rostrolateral prefrontal patient group. Color indicates the number of patients with lesions in that area.
Images are ﬂipped: Left¼Right and Right¼Left.
Fig. 2. Overlay of brain areas damaged across the 7 patients in the parietal patient group. Color indicates the number of patients with lesions in that area. Images are
ﬂipped: Left¼Right and Right¼Left.
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Table 2








Age 61.0 (4.5) 58.4 (2.7) 57.7 (2.0)
Education 13.7 (1.4) 14.6 (2.1) 16.2 (2.9)
Pre-injury AFQT-7A 53.3 (30.7) 55.8 (21.9) 43.9 (30.0)
Total cm3 all
damaged areas
– 29.3 (27.3) 22.7 (17.2)
WAIS verbal IQ 94.7 (7.6)n 110.2 (8.7)n 95.9 (12.2)
WAIS performance
IQ
98.3 (9.1) 103.5 (4.7) 100.7 (21.1)
WAIS full IQ 96.3 (8.5) 106.3 (4.8) 99.5 (15.9)
WMS overall
general memory 99.8 (12.2) 117.5 (21.9) 95.4 (15.1)
WMS working
memory
95.5 (10.0) 99.3 (8.4) 89.0 (14.7)
AFQT-7A: Armed Forces Qualiﬁcation Test percentile rank; WAIS refers to
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III; WMS refers to Wechsler Memory Scale-III.
n p¼ .05 (Tukey HSD post-hoc tests).
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had lesions outside of the parietal lobes.
The study also included a group of N¼6 healthy control participants, who were
matched to the patient groups in age, education, pre-injury IQ, general memory,
working memory, and performance/full IQ, though the rostrolateral patients did
score signiﬁcantly higher than the normal controls on verbal IQ (see below).
All patients and healthy controls gave informed consent for participation in
the study. The experimental protocol was approved by the National Institute of
Neurological Disorders and Stroke Institutional Review Board.
2.2. Neuropsychological assessment
Pre-injury general intelligence of the participants was assessed via the Armed
Forces Qualiﬁcation Test (AFQT-7A), which is administered to individuals upon entry
into the military. The AFQT-7A has been extensively standardized within the U.S.
military and correlates highly with WAIS IQ scores (Grafman et al., 1988). Analysis
revealed no signiﬁcant differences in pre-injury AFQT-7A percentile rank scores
between the control, rostrolateral prefrontal and parietal patient groups (Table 2).
All study participants received a neuropsychological assessment, the scores of
which are reported in Table 2. The scores indicate that the participants’ memory and
IQ are generally within the normal range. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to
examine differences in demographic and neuropsychological scores between the
rostrolateral prefrontal, parietal, and normal control groups. There were no sig-
niﬁcant differences between the groups in mean age, number of years of education,
total cm3 volume loss in damaged areas (for the patient groups), WAIS-III
performance IQ, WAIS-III full IQ and Wechsler overall general memory and working
memory scores (Table 2). There was a signiﬁcant difference between the groups in
WAIS-III verbal IQ scores, F(2,17)¼4.05, po .05. Tukey HSD post-hoc analysis
indicated that the rostrolateral prefrontal group had a higher WAIS-III verbal IQ
score than the control group (mean difference¼15.5, po .05). Thus, we incorporated
the WAIS-III verbal IQ score as a covariate in our results analysis, as discussed below.
2.3. Determination of lesion location and extent
The lesion sites, total volume loss, and intersection of lesion sites with BAs, as
determined from patient computerized tomography (CT) scans, are speciﬁed in
summary overlay images in Figs. 1 and 2. The CT scans were acquired on a GE Light
Speed Plus CT scanner in helical mode (150 slices per subject, ﬁeld of view covering
head only). Images were reconstructed with an in-plane voxel size of .4_.4 mm,
overlapping slice thickness of 2.5 mm, and a 1 mm slice interval. Skull and scalp
components were removed using the BET algorithm in MEDx (Medical Numerics Inc.,
Sterling, VA, USA). Patient CT volumes were imported into ABLe (Medical Numerics
Inc.) software (Makale et al., 2002) and displayed as a series of slices in a light box
format. A trained neuropsychiatrist manually traced the lesions on all relevant slices.
The tracings were then reviewed by J.G., who was blind to the results of the
neuropsychological testing. Lesion location and volume were determined from the
CT images using the Analysis of Brain Lesion software (Makale et al., 2002; Solomon,
Raymont, Braun, Butman, & Grafman, 2007) contained in MEDx v3.44 (Medical
Numerics) with enhancements to support the Automated Anatomical Labeling atlas
(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). Total lesion volume (in cubic centimeters) and lesion
volume (as a percentage of total brain volume) was calculated by voxel count.
The patient volume was then normalized to a reference template volume by a
12-parameter afﬁne linear transformation (allowing for translation, rotation, scaling,and shearing). The lesion voxels were included in the registration process. The ABLe
reference volume is an MRI of a 27-year-old normal male transformed to Talairach
space with a 12-parameter afﬁne linear transformation. The volume is resliced at 171
relative to the inferior orbitomeatal line, and 11 transverse slices that best match the
Damasio (Damasio & Damasio, 1989) templates have been selected by a neuror-
adiologist and interactively labeled with BAs by reference to the Damasio templates.
Although the locations of BAs in these templates are approximate, they are widely
accepted in the neuropsychology and neurology communities.
The registered patient volume was then resliced at a 171 cranial angle, and the
11 sections that matched the ABLe reference volume (and hence the Damasio
templates) were automatically extracted. Because the BAs are premarked on the
11 slices of the ABLe reference volume (see above) and the patient brain volume
has been registered and resliced to conform to this template, the intersection of
lesion with BAs was calculated by a simple voxel-by-voxel comparison.
The summary overlay images (Figs. 1 and 2), highlight that the regions with
the most extensive damage across the 2 patient groups are the bilateral
rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, in particular BA 10, and the bilateral parietal
cortex, in particular BA 7, 40. There were no signiﬁcant correlations between
overall lesion size (CC volume loss) or total percent of brain damaged and accuracy
or reaction time scores on the transitive inference task administered in the study.
One concern with traumatic injury patients is in regard to contre-coup brain
injury associated with signiﬁcant force and trauma. However, there is no strong
evidence that penetrating traumatic brain injury due to shell fragments, which is
the cause of damage among most of our patient population, routinely results in
counter-coup effects (Grafman & Salazar, 1987). Certainly our CT scan analysis
only rarely gave such hints. While we cannot eliminate the possibility of any
microscopic damage (only an autopsy could do that), based on CT scan data, we
believe that most of the energy imparted from the penetrating brain wounds
occurred at the point of entry and along the missile path.
2.4. Task and administration
Participants were asked to engage in a computer administered four-term
transitive inference task. Since four-term inference tasks can be overly demanding
for patients, only three terms were necessary to resolve the inference problems. The
use of the fourth term increased difﬁculty by allowing for the possibility of multiple
models. This was deemed desirable as previous studies indicated maximal involve-
ment of the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 10) for the most difﬁcult items
(Christoff et al., 2001; Kroger et al., 2002; Ramnani, & Owen, 2004). Thus this task
can be described as a ‘‘four-term transitive inference task with three relevant terms.’’
A total of 48 inference problems (24 valid and 24 invalid) were presented (see
Appendix A). Of the 24 invalid trials, 12 were inconsistent, and 12 were
indeterminate. This distribution allowed for a balance of yes/no responses while
presenting an adequate number of each of the trial types. The stimuli were further
divided into 27 chained (Level 1 difﬁculty) problems and 21 scrambled (Level
2 difﬁculty) problems as deﬁned by Waltz et al. (1999). When the terms are
presented in chained/linear/sequential order (Level 1 difﬁculty), reasoners are able
to construct a linear/sequential spatial map of the arguments and simply evaluate
the conclusion against the representation, as in the following example:Mary is taller than Fiona;
Mary is taller than Carol;
Fiona is taller than Rosemary;
Mary is taller than Rosemary? (correct response: ‘‘yes/valid’’)However, when the terms are presented in scrambled/non-sequential/non-
linear order (Level 2 difﬁculty) Reasoners must ‘‘ﬂip’’ the spatial representation or
consider two relations simultaneously in order to resolve the inference, as in the
following example:Fiona is smarter than Rosemary;
Mary is smarter than Carol;
Mary is smarter than Fiona;
Rosemary is smarter than Mary? (correct response: ‘‘no’’).While individual names were repeated in some of the item premises in an
effort to hold content constant across valid, indeterminate, and inconsistent forms,
there was no repetition of complete trials. As the premises do not apply to speciﬁc,
known ‘‘Marys’’ and ‘‘Rosemarys,’’ there is no reason to expect carry over from one
trial to another.
Participants were given an explanation of logical validity along with several
examples. Once they understood the concept of validity, they were given the task
and instructed (in writing) as follows: ‘‘Your task is to decide if the conclusion
follows logically from the premises as per the examples. If you think the argument
is VALID, press the ‘c’ key. If you think the argument is NOT VALID, press the ‘m’
key.’’ Participants proceeded through the problems at their own pace, and were
given a maximum of 40 s to respond to each trial. After 40 s, the program
automatically proceeded to the next item and non-responses were scored as
incorrect. The difﬁculty (Level 1 versus Level 2) and validity of the inferences was
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Participant reaction time (RT) from presentation onset of the full inference chain
and accuracy scores were measured for analysis.
2.5. Data analyses
Given the small sample sizes of the patient and control groups, we ﬁrst
performed an exploratory data analysis of the accuracy scores on the transitive
inference task. Visual examination of normal Q–Q plots in conjunction with
Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K–S) tests of normality all indicated that the chained
(Level 1) accuracy scores were normally distributed (K–S p¼ .349). These same
tests indicated that the scrambled (Level 2) accuracy scores were also normally
distributed (K–S p¼ .928). We then performed an exploratory data analysis of the
reaction times on the transitive inference task. Visual examination of normal Q–Q
plots in conjunction with Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests of normality all indicated
that the chained (Level 1) and scrambled (Level 2) reaction times were normally
distributed (K–S, p¼ .813 and p¼ .748, respectively). Finally, a Levene’s Test of
Equality of Error Variances indicated that variance in both chained (p¼ .441) and
scrambled (p¼ .712) accuracy scores was equivalent across the control and patient
groups. This equivalence in error was conﬁrmed when post-hoc results with a
Games–Howell test were similar to post-hoc results obtained with Tukey HSD
tests as discussed in the results section below. Given the results of these normality
tests, we proceeded with standard parametric analysis for the rest of the results.3. Results
A repeated measures analysis (General Linear Model) with Group
(rostrolateral prefrontal, parietal, control) as the independent vari-
able and Difﬁculty (chained, scrambled) as the repeated measures
variable revealed a main effect of Group on the accuracy scores,
F(2,17)¼4.21, p¼ .037. There was also a trend for a main effect of
Difﬁculty on accuracy scores, F(1,17)¼3.91, p¼ .068, with all of the
groups showing lower scores for scrambled versus chained items
(Table 3). Given the small sample sizes in our study and the desire to
minimize Type I error, we used Tukey HSD post-hoc analysis to
examine the differences in accuracy scores between the groups,
given its ability to control family-wise error and to decrease the per-
comparison error rate (Sato, 1996). This analysis indicated that the
parietal patient group scored signiﬁcantly lower than the control
group on all the inference problems (i.e., both chained and scrambled
items combined: mean difference¼ .21, p¼ .047). The parietal
patient group also scored lower than the rostrolateral prefrontal
patient group on all the inference problems, although this difference
only emerged at a trend level (mean difference¼ .18, p¼ .058).
There was no signiﬁcant difference in accuracy scores between the
rostrolateral prefrontal and normal control groups on all the infer-
ence problems (mean difference¼ .03, p¼1.00). Finally, there was
no interaction of GroupDifﬁculty, F(2,17)¼ .76, p¼ .49, suggesting
that no patient group was particularly more impaired on the more
difﬁcult (Level 2) transitive inference items.
We ran similar repeated-measures analysis to examine effects
on mean RTs from presentation onset of the full inference chain to
participant’s responses across all of the transitive inference items.
This analysis revealed no signiﬁcant difference in RTs for scrambledTable 3
Mean percent accuracy (SD) and reaction times (SD) (in seconds) for 27 chained (L
participant groups.
Measures Difﬁculty Normal controls (N¼6) Rostrolateral p
Accuracy Chained .74 (.10) .68 (.23)
Scrambled .65 (.16) .66 (.13)
All items .70 (.09)n .67 (.18)nn
RT Chained 18.1 (4.7) 23.9 (3.8)
Scrambled 18.7 (4.9) 24.9 (4.8)
All items 18.4 (4.3) 24.3 (3.7)
n Parietal patientsonormal controls, p¼ .047 (Tukey HSD post-hoc tests).
nn Parietal patientsorostrolateral patients, p¼ .058 (Tukey HSD post-hoc tests).
nnn Rostrolateral patients¼normal controls, p¼1.00 (Tukey HSD post-hoc tests).(Level 2) versus chained (Level 1) items, F(1,17)¼3.02, p¼ .104
(Table 3). Further, there was no signiﬁcant main effect of Group on
RT, F(2,17)¼ .96, p¼ .41, nor an interaction of Group and Difﬁculty,
F(2,17)¼ .93, p¼ .42. We also examined RT data for correctly-
answered items only, and this analysis revealed a signiﬁcant main
effect for Difﬁculty, F(1,17)¼18.9, p¼ .001, with all of the groups
showing higher RTs for chained (Level 1) versus scrambled (Level 2)
items. Similar to the RT results for all items, there was no Group by
Difﬁculty interaction and no main effect of Group.
We then ran another repeated measures analysis with Group
(rostrolateral prefrontal, parietal, control) as the independent vari-
able and Difﬁculty (chained, scrambled) as the repeated measures
variable, including WAIS verbal IQ as a covariate, given that it was
the only demographic/neuropsychological variable that showed a
signiﬁcantly different score between the groups. With this covariate
included in the model, the estimated accuracy scores across all the
inference problems (i.e., both chained and scrambled items com-
bined) was .489 (parietal patients), .626 (rostrolateral prefrontal
patients), and .707 (normal controls). There were no signiﬁcant
interactions between Difﬁculty and WAIS verbal IQ score,
F(1,14)¼ .333, p¼ .574 or Difﬁculty and Group, F(2,14)¼ .889,
p¼ .435. There was also no signiﬁcant main effect of Difﬁculty,
F(1,14)¼ .152, p¼ .703, or WAIS verbal IQ, F(1,14)¼ .899, p¼ .360.
However, there was a signiﬁcant main effect of Group, F(2,14)¼3.84,
p¼ .049. Thus, the signiﬁcant difference between the groups on the
accuracy scores for the transitive inference task held when theWAIS-
III verbal IQ scores were included in the model.4. Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine the roles of the
rostrolateral prefrontal cortex versus the parietal cortex in resolving
transitive inference problems. The results indicated that the parietal
patients were signiﬁcantly impaired on the transitive inference task
compared to normal controls, and were impaired on the transitive
inference task compared to the rostrolateral prefrontal patients,
albeit at a trend level. There was no signiﬁcant difference on the
task between the rostrolateral prefrontal patients and the normal
controls. The results suggest that the parietal cortex, rather than the
rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, is necessary for transitive inference.
This ﬁnding is consistent with many previous imaging studies and
two meta-analyses that point to the importance of the parietal
lobes for transitive reasoning (Goel, 2003; Goel et al., 2000; Goel &
Dolan, 2001, 2003; Knauff et al., 2003; Prado et al., 2010, 2011).
These results are also consistent with Vartanian et al. (2009) in
that their frontal temporal dementia patients were not impaired
in transitive inference arguments involving propositions that
participants did not have beliefs about. There is also no apparent
conﬂict between our results and those of Koscik and Tranel
(2012), in that their reasoning impaired group had lesions in
ventral medial prefrontal cortex (not rostrolateral prefrontalevel 1) and 21 scrambled (Level 2) transitive inference items across the three
atients (N¼5) Parietal patients (N¼7) All participants (N¼18)
.56 (.17) .65 (.18)
.40 (.19) .55 (.20)
.49 (.16)nnn .62 (.17)
21.5 (10.1) 20.9 (7.3)
24.7 (11.1) 22.6 (8.2)
22.9 (10.4) 21.9 (7.3)
R.L. Waechter et al. / Neuropsychologia 51 (2013) 464–471 469cortex) and their control patient group had lesions concentrated
in temporal medial cortex (rather than parietal cortex).
Interestingly, the performance of our patients with frontal lobe
lesions does not replicate the results reported by Waltz et al. (1999).
As noted in the Section 1, their frontal dementia patients were
selectively impaired in the difﬁcult, Level 2 (scrambled) inference
condition. Despite the use of very similar stimuli to Waltz et al.
(1999), neither our accuracy nor RT data support a selectively
impaired performance in resolving scrambled versus chained transi-
tive inference problems by patients with lesions to the prefrontal
cortex. There are several possible reasons for this discrepancy.
First, Waltz et al. (1999) included frontotemporal dementia
patients in their study, and were not able to specify focal brain
areas within the frontal lobes that were impacted by the disease.
Thus, their results may have been driven by damage to the
dorsolateral and/or dorsal medial regions rather than the rostro-
lateral prefrontal cortex (BA 10).
Second, Waltz et al. (1999) refer to the importance of working
memory for resolving Scrambled (Level 2) transitive inferences but
do not provide working memory measures for their patients.
However, both the temporal and frontal patients in their study
scored relatively low on the WAIS-III full IQ (prefrontal 9676.4;
temporal 94.878.0). This is consistent with our parietal patient
group (99.5715.9), but generally lower than our rostrolateral
prefrontal group (106.374.8). It is possible that the frontal demen-
tia patients inWaltz et al. (1999) may have experienced widespread
frontal cortex damage, including the DLPFC, which would have
negatively impacted this working memory brain circuit (Cohen
et al., 1997), and performance on the transitive inference task.
There is evidence for a connection between working memory
capacity and at least some forms of transitive inference reasoning
(Libben & Titone, 2007). However, the fact that the parietal patients
showed impairment on the transitive inference task despite similar
WMS-III working memory scores between the three groups in the
present study suggests a critical role for parietal cortex in transitive
inference, over and above general working memory requirements.
Given that the parietal lobes are known to be critical for spatial
manipulation (Cohen et al., 1996), and that a signiﬁcant theory of
logical reasoning postulates the construction and manipulation of
spatial mental models in logical inference (Johnson-Laird, 1986;
Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982), it is plausible that this is the function
that the parietal lobes are serving.
While Waltz et al. (1999) discuss relational integration in
conjunction with overall frontal lobe functioning; other researchers
(e.g., Fangmeier et al., 2006; Wendelken & Bunge, 2009) have
recently focused upon BA 10 (right medial anterior prefrontal and
right rostrolateral prefrontal, respectively) as the speciﬁc frontal
region critical for ‘‘relational integration’’. While we do not question
the activation of BA 10 in these studies, in light of our current results
and published meta-analyses (Goel, 2007; Prado et al., 2011), we
believe that the association between rostrolateral prefrontal (BA 10)
and the general function of ‘‘relational integration’’ may be pre-
mature. It is important to try to understand possible methodological
differences that may account for these diverging results.
Fangmeier et al. (2006) used fMRI to examine brain activation
during a nonlinguistic transitive inference task. They differentiated
between the neural activations associated with the presentation of
the ﬁrst premise, the presentation of the second premise and its
integration with the ﬁrst, and evaluation of the conclusion. While
bilateral parietal lobe activation was involved in all conditions, they
noted the recruitment of right anterior medial PFC (BA 10) in the
premise integration condition, and concluded that this region is
speciﬁcally responsible for the combination and coordination (i.e.,
integration) of premises (Fangmeier et al., 2006).
Wendelken and Bunge (2009) also used fMRI to examine
participants’ ability to engage in explicit transitive inference tasksusing nonlinguistic/pictorial stimuli. They examined the full
reasoning process, rather than the individual components, as
above. In comparing a three-term relational inference condition
with a two-term relational baseline condition they reported
activation in bilateral parietal lobes and right rostrolateral pre-
frontal cortex (BA 10). They concluded that the rostrolateral
prefrontal cortex (BA 10) activation is the ‘‘most prominent locus
of activation during transitive inference’’ (p. 843).
First, while both studies report activation in BA 10, they do so in
different conditions. Fangmeier et al. (2006) report it speciﬁcally, and
only in, a premise integration condition, while Wendelken and Bunge
(2009) report it in the main effect of reasoning. But perhaps more
importantly, these two studies differ from other studies of transitive
reasoning in the neuroimaging literature by virtue of using nonlin-
guistic stimuli. In particular, the indicated spatial relations were
actually exempliﬁed or embodied in the stimuli presentation rather
than simply being stated in a proposition.
The linguistic presentation of the task as used in the present
study (and many imaging studies) involves the simultaneous (or
sequential) presentation of premises and conclusion, requiring
participants to carry out at least the following steps: (1) map from
the propositional representation that preserves the structural
properties of linguistic strings in which the premises are stated
to a representation that preserves/exempliﬁes the spatial rela-
tions that are stated in the proposition; (2) hold the transformed
representations of premises in working memory, aided by exter-
nal stimuli representation (all premises remained on the screen
for the duration of the task) and integrate them (the retention of
the integrated representation is not aided by external stimuli
presentation); and (3) resolve the inference.
The stimuli and presentation methods used by Fangmeier et al.
(2006) and Wendelken and Bunge (2009) placed different task
requirements on participants. In the Fangmeier et al. (2006)
study, participants had to: (1) hold explicitly presented/exempli-
ﬁed spatial relations in working memory (the stimuli did not
remain on the screen for the duration of the task); (2) integrate
the two premises while holding them in working memory, but
with no external visual aid (the stimuli did not remain on the
screen for the duration of the task); and (3) resolve the inference.
The ﬁrst two steps here differ considerably from those required in
our task.
The Wendelken and Bunge (2009) task material and presenta-
tion placed still different task requirements on participants:
(1) their participants were also presented with exempliﬁed
spatial relations, as above, but they did not have to hold them
in working memory (because they were continuously present in
the external stimuli); (2) integrate the premises (again aided by
external stimuli); and (3) resolve the inference. It is possible that
these differing task requirements have important consequences
for the strategy and neuronal resources employed by participants.
One obvious possibility is that where linguistic stimuli are
used, greater effort and resources are required to map the stimuli
onto spatial mental models as a prerequisite to solution (Johnson-
Laird, 1986; Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982). This requires the
parietal cortex (Cohen et al., 1996; Goel & Dolan, 2001; Knauff
et al., 2003; Zacks, 2008). In the case of the pictorial stimuli, this
mapping has already been done in the task presentation, render-
ing the involvement of parietal cortex less critical and perhaps
shifting processing to the prefrontal cortex.
In summary, our results suggest that the parietal cortex is
necessary for enabling transitive inference. When the task con-
tains additional elements including content that we have beliefs
about, conﬂict, indeterminacy, differential working memory
loads, or spatial versus linguistic presentation of information,
then other key cortical sectors including various regions within
the prefrontal cortex will become important.
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Wellcome Trust Grant #089233 to Vinod Goel and Jordan Grafman.Appendix A. Transitive inference items presented in the studyChained (Level 1) Items
Mary is smarter
than CarolMary is smarter
than CarolMary is smarter
than CarolMary is smarter
than FionaMary is smarter
than FionaMary is smarter
than FionaFiona is smarter
than RosemaryFiona is smarter
than RosemaryFiona is smarter
than RosemaryMary is smarter
than Rosemary?Carol is smarter
than Fiona?Rosemary is
smarter than Mary?Mary is smarter
than FionaMary is smarter
than FionaMary is smarter
than FionaFiona is smarter
than RosemaryFiona is smarter
than RosemaryFiona is smarter
than RosemaryMary is smarter
than CarolMary is smarter
than CarolMary is smarter
than CarolMary is smarter
than Rosemary?Carol is smarter
than Fiona?Rosemary is
smarter than Mary?Mary is taller than
FionaMary is taller than
FionaMary is taller than
FionaMary is taller than
CarolMary is taller than
CarolMary is taller than
CarolFiona is taller than
RosemaryFiona is taller than
RosemaryFiona is taller than
RosemaryMary is taller than
Rosemary?Carol is taller than
Fiona?Rosemary is taller
than Mary?Natalie is healthier
than LucyNatalie is healthier
than LucyNatalie is healthier
than LucyLucy is healthier
than SamanthaLucy is healthier
than SamanthaLucy is healthier
than SamanthaLucy is healthier
than GloriaLucy is healthier
than GloriaLucy is healthier






than LucyNatalie is healthier
than LucyNatalie is healthier
than LucyLucy is healthier
than GloriaLucy is healthier
than GloriaLucy is healthier
than GloriaLucy is healthier
than SamanthaLucy is healthier
than SamanthaLucy is healthier





Natalie?Jessica is faster than
NicolePeter is lazier than
MatNick is messier
than WilliamJessica is faster than
MelaniePeter is lazier than
ClydeNick is messier
than WesleyMelanie is faster
than ValerieClyde is lazier than
HenryWesley is messier
than LiamJessica is faster than
Valerie?Peter is lazier than
Henry?Nick is messier
than Liam?Patricia is smaller
than MaxineFelix is bigger than
RandyJane is tinier than
HannaPatricia is smaller
than CandyFelix is bigger than
DavidJane is tinier than
JackieCandy is smaller
than ElaineDavid is bigger than
AllenJackie is tinier than
MeghanPatricia is smaller
than Elaine?Felix is bigger than
Allen?Jane is tinier tan
Meghan?John is brighter
than GregNina is nastier than
SusanNatasha is prettier
than LauraGreg is brighter
than AndreSusan is nastier
than AudreyLaura is prettier
than SandyGreg is brighter
than PatrickSusan is nastier
than LisaLaura is prettier
than GertrudeJohn is brighter
than Andre?Nina is nastier than
Audrey?Natasha is prettier
than Sandy?Robert is littler
than JoelRonald is larger
than RichardCamilla is slimmer
than DaisyJoel is littler than
WinstonRichard is larger
than BobDaisy is slimmer
than MeredithJoel is littler than
DelRichard is larger
than FransDaisy is slimmer
than CourtneyRobert is littler
than Winston?Ronald is larger
than Bob?Camilla is slimmer
than Meredith?Scrambled (Level 2) Items
Lucy is healthier
than GloriaLucy is healthier
than GloriaLucy is healthier





Natalie?Lucy is shorter than
SamanthaLucy is shorter than
SamanthaLucy is shorter than
SamanthaLucy is shorter than
GloriaLucy is shorter than
GloriaLucy is shorter than
GloriaNatalie is shorter
than LucyNatalie is shorter
than LucyNatalie is shorter
than LucyNatalie is shorter
than Samantha?Samantha is shorter
than Gloria?Samantha is shorter
than Natalie?Lucy is shorter than
GloriaLucy is shorter than
GloriaLucy is shorter than
GloriaNatalie is shorter
than LucyNatalie is shorter
than LucyNatalie is shorter
than LucyLucy is shorter than
SamanthaLucy is shorter than
SamanthaLucy is shorter than
SamanthaNatalie is shorter
than Samantha?Samantha is shorter
than Gloria?Samantha is shorter
than Natalie?Lucy is shorter than
GloriaLucy is shorter than
GloriaLucy is shorter than
GloriaLucy is shorter than
SamanthaLucy is shorter than
SamanthaLucy is shorter than
SamanthaNatalie is shorter
than LucyNatalie is shorter
than LucyNatalie is shorter
than LucyNatalie is shorter
than Samantha?Samantha is shorter
than Gloria?Samantha is shorter
than Natalie?References
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